Preference variables are included in the inverse Rotterdam model based on the TintnerIchimura-Basmann relationship linking preference effects on quantities demanded to price effects and preference effects on marginal utilities. Restrictions are made on the effects of the preference variables on the marginal utilities, resulting in reductions in the parameter space for the preference variables in both direct and inverse demand systems.
Restrictions have been made on the preference effects on marginal utilities, resulting in reductions in the preference-variable parameter space in direct demand systems (e.g., Theil, 1980b; Duffy) . The present paper shows the associated implications for the inverse demand parameters. Preference effects in the direct demand system are translated into corresponding effects in the inverse demand system, and an inverse-demand system with a preference-variable parameterization, that can be straightforwardly used to explore preference restrictions as in the direct demand system, is developed.
The results of this paper show that given the direct demand elasticities with respect to n product-specific preference variables can be written as -ε * γ where ε * is a matrix of compensated price elasticities and γ is a matrix of marginal utility elasticities with respect to the preference variables, the inverse demand elasticities are (I -ι w')γ, where I is the identity matrix, ι is a unit vector and w is a vector of budget shares.
An empirical analysis of quality impacts in an inverse demand system for U.S.
fresh citrus is also discussed. The focus is on how prices for different varieties of citrus are impacted by variety specific quality variables.
The paper consists of a review of direct and inverse demand systems, u = u(q', z') subject to p=q = x, where u is utility; p= = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) and q= = (q 1 , . . . , q n )
are price and quantity vectors with p i and q i being the price and quantity of good i, respectively; x is total expenditures or income; and z' = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) is a vector of product-specific preferences variables such as advertising. The first-order conditions for this problem are Mu/Mq = λp and p=q = x, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier which is equal to Mu/Mx. For direct demand, the solution of the first-order conditions yields q = q(p, x, z), and the Lagrange multiplier equation λ = λ(p, x, z). Alternatively, for indirect or inverse demand, the solution is v = v(q, z), where v' = (p 1 /x, …, p n /x) or incomenormalized prices. The quantities and prices for these two solutions are of course exactly the same. Below, the relationships between the two demand systems are reviewed with a focus on the effects of the preference variables. The Rotterdam demand model 1 is used for this purpose as the relationship between direct and inverse demand with respect to preference variable impacts can be straightforwardly shown for this demand specification. The Rotterdam model is based on the total differential of the first-order conditions, Mu/Mq = λp and p=q = x, making it convenient to examine preference variable impacts through the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship which is based on an extension of this total differential.
2
Following Theil (1975 Theil ( , 1976 Theil ( , 1980a , the direct Rotterdam model can be written element of the substitution matrix S; and β ij = w i (Mlog q i /Mlog z j ). The elasticity of the demand with respect to the j th preference variable is (Mlog q i /Mlog z j ), and, thus, the preference variable coefficient β ij is the budget share times this elasticity. The MPC also equals the budget share times the income elasticity η i = (Mlog q i /Mlog x), i.e., θ i = w i η i ; and the Slutsky coefficient equals the budget share times the compensated price elasticity ε Based on the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship, the preference-variable coefficients in equation (1) can be written as
where γ jk = Mlog(Mu/Mq j )/Mlog(z k ), i.e., γ jk is the elasticity of the marginal utility of good j with respect to the preference variable z k . Equation (2) is the source of preferencevariable parameter restrictions in this paper.
Substituting equation (2) into model (1) results in
where the term d(log p j ) -3 k γ jk d(log z k ) can be viewed as a preference, adjusted price.
The corresponding inverse Rotterdam model can be written as (e.g., Barten and Bettendorf; Brown, Lee and Seale) To show the relationship between the direct and inverse demand systems, the models are formulated below in term of matrices and elasticities, i.e. x n matrix of compensated price elasticities; g is an n x 1 vector of scale coefficients; h is an n x n matrix of quantity or Antonelli coefficients; α is an n x n matrix of preference coefficients; μ is an n x 1 matrix of scale elasticities; δ * is an n x n matrix of compensated quantity elasticities; and ρ is an n x n matrix of advertising elasticities.
The general restrictions on the direct Rotterdam model are (e.g., Theil 1975 Theil , 1976 Theil , 1980a (7a) adding up:
where ι' is an n x 1 vector of ones. Note that restriction (7a) requires that the preference effects also obey adding up, i.e., given the advertising coefficient matrix β equals -πγ, ι'β = -ι'πγ = 0, since ι'π = 0. Restrictions (7a) through (7c) are for the usual Rotterdam parameterization (5a). The corresponding restrictions on the elasticities in specification (5b) are a) w'η = 1 (Engle aggregation) and w'ε * = 0 or w'(ε + η w') = w'ε + w'= 0 (Cournot aggregation), b) ε * ι = 0 or (ε + η w') ι = ει + η = 0 (homogeneity), and c) ε
The general restrictions on the inverse Rotterdam model are (e.g., Barten and Bettendorf; Brown, Lee and Seale) (8a) adding up:
The corresponding restrictions on the elasticities in specification (6b) are a) w'μ = -1 and w'δ * = 0 or w'(δ -μw') = w'δ + w'= 0, b) δ * ι = 0 or (δ -μw') ι = δι -μ = 0, and c)
ŵ.
Relationship Between Preference Effects in the Direct and Inverse Demand Systems
Anderson has shown the relationship between the direct and inverse demand systems with respect to price, quantity, income and scale effects. Below, these relationships are extended to the preference variable effects. The objective is to transform the direct Rotterdam model to the inverse Rotterdam model to reveal the structure of the inverse demand preference-variable coefficients. The first step is to pre-multiply equation (5b) by ŵ -1 to find
If ε * were nonsingular, we could simply multiply both sides of equation (9) by the inverse of ε * and rearrange , but this is not the case given (7b). The problem is that price effects of equation (9) are compensated. An inversion, however, can be made by transforming the compensated elasticities of equation (9) to uncompensated ones. To accomplish this, replace DQ in equation (9) by its equivalent Dx -w'Dp, and rearrange the result, i.e.,
where again ε = ε * -η w', the uncompensated price elasticities. The homogeneity
Based on the inverse function theorem, the uncompensated elasticity matrix ε will be nonsingular, in general, so that multiplying equation (10c) through by its inverse ε -1 , denoted by δ, and rearranging yields
or, further rearranging and simplifying,
where again Dv= Dp -ιDx, δ * = δ -μw', DQ = w'Dq, and I is the n x n identity matrix.
In equation (11a), the term -δη equals the n x 1 vector of unit elements, since δε = I, and thus δε ι = ι or -δη = ι given ε ι = -η; this relationship follows from the homogeneity condition noted after equation (7), which for convenience is repeated in the present context as δ(ε * -η w')ι = Iι = ι, or δε * ι -δη w'ι = ι or -δη= ι, since ε * ι = 0 based on condition (7b) and w'ι =1. The term δε * in equation (11a) equals I -ι w', since δ(ε * -η w') = I, and thus δε * = I + δη w', and given the previous result that -δη= ι, we have δε * = I -ι w'. (Similarly, εδι = εμ = ι and εδ * = I -ιw'. Thus, εδ * = δε * .)
Finally, multiplying (11b) through by ŵ yields (12) ŵDv = ŵμ DQ + ŵδ * Dq + (ŵ -w w')γDz, which is the same as equation (6a) or (6b) except for the specification of the coefficients on the preference variables (Dz). In equations (6a) and (6b), these coefficients are α = ŵρ while in equation (12) they are (ŵ -w w')γ. Thus, we conclude
Preference variable coefficient specification (13) can also be obtained using the Hotelling-Wold identity which states
Taking the log of equation (14) results in
and differentiating this equation with respect to log z j yields
Based on a) the first order condition Mu/Mq j = λp j , b) 3 j q j Mu/Mq j = λ3 j p j q j = λx and c) given q k are fixed so that Mq k /Mlog z = 0, the last term on the right-hand side of equation (16) can be written as
Hence, equation (16) can be written as
or, multiplying through by w i ,
where γ ij =M log(Mu/Mq i )/ Mlog(z j ). Equation (17b) is the non-matrix version of equation (13).
In the above direct and inverse demand systems (5a) and (12), the matrix γ is potentially a source of restrictions on the preference variable impacts; that is, restrictions on the preference variable impacts can be made through restrictions on the effects of the preference variables on marginal utilities. For example, in the direct demand system, Theil (1980b) , assumed γ was a scalar times the Identity matrix, while, Duffy assumed it was a diagonal matrix (â). The Theil (1980b) and Duffy specifications are based on the assumption that the preference variable for good i only effects the marginal utility of that good. For a group of uniform substitutes, Brown and Lee (2002) showed that the same result can be obtained based on the weaker assumption that γ = â + ιb' where b'= (b 1 , b 2 , …, b n ) with b i being a scalar; this specification allows the preference variable for good i to effect the marginal utility of other goods, uniformly across the goods in the group. In the direct and inverse models, (5a) and (12), the preference variable effects are -πγ and (ŵ -w w')γ, respectively, which for the above structure for γ become -π(â + ιb') = -πâ and (ŵ -w w') (â + ιb') = (ŵ -w w') â with the terms related to b' disappearing given -πι = 0 based on restriction (7b) and (ŵ -w w') ι= 0. Although assuming b is zero yields the same result, such an assumption may not realistic for a group of closely related goods such as uniform substitutes. Thus, we see that the Duffy assumption can be extended to cases where preference variables have uniform effects across the marginal utilities of the goods in the group.
In estimating the inverse model, there is, however, an endogeneity problem with the budget shares embedded in the term (ŵ -w w')γ. This problem might be handled by using mean budget shares in this term, instrumental variables, or perhaps lagged budget shares, as suggested to deal with a similar endogeneity problem in the Almost Ideal Demand System involving budget shares embedded in the Stone price index (Eales and Unnevehr). (13) is γ = â + ιb'. The term (ŵ -w w') γDz in the model then becomes (ŵ -w w') â Dz, since (ŵ -w w') ιb' = 0. Thus, the impact of preference variable j in the equation for good i can be written as (w i ∆ ij -w i w j ) a j Dz j , where again ∆ ij is the Kronecker delta. In estimating this term lagged budget shares were used to avoid the endogeneity problem mentioned earlier.
Homogeneity and symmetry, conditions (8b) and (8c), were imposed as part of the maintained hypothesis in estimating the model. The adding-up condition (8a) holds as the data add up by construction. The infinitely small changes in the logarithms of prices and quantities in the differential model were measured by discrete differences (Theil 1975 (Theil , 1976 ). The quality variables, which are percentages of volumes that are RW, were not transformed to log values, and the levels of these variables were similarly differenced. To account for seasonality in demand, the variables were 52 nd differenced (for the 52 weeks in a year)--d(log p it ) = log p it -log p it-52 , d(log q it ) = log q it -log q it-52 and dz kt = z kt -z kt-52 (Duffy, Brown and Lee 1997) . Average budget share values underlying the differencing were used in constructing the model variables---w i,t was replaced by (w i,t + w i,t-52 )/2.
The demand specifications studied are conditional on expenditure or income allocated to the three citrus varieties. Income allocated to the citrus group is measured by the conditional Divisia volume index for this group which was treated as independent of the error term added to each fresh citrus inverse demand equation for estimation, based on the theory of rational random behavior (Theil 1980a; Brown, Behr and Lee) . In estimating the (conditional) inverse Rotterdam model for fresh citrus, firstorder autocorrelation was found to exist, which required estimating an additional parameter ρ (Berndt and Savin). Model estimates are shown in Table 2 (equations (4) with α specified in equation (13) suggests that some households may be purchasing combinations of these citrus varieties.
All coefficients on the quality measures were positive, suggesting the quality of random weight fruit is higher than that for fixed weight fruit. The RW coefficients may also be reflecting a preference for less restricted packaging or the impact of other in-store differences in merchandising of RW and FW fruit.
The uncompensated elasticities (flexibilities) for the inverse citrus demand system are provided in Table 3 . The scale elasticities for grapefruit, oranges and tangerines are -.93, -.99 and -1.06, respectively, indicating the if all three quantities increased proportionately, say by 10% , the price of tangerines would decrease the greatest by10.6%, while the price of grapefruit would decrease the least by 9.3%. The ownquantity elasticities for grapefruit, oranges and tangerines are -.38, -.73, and -.39, respectively, indicating the price of oranges is more sensitive to own-quantity than the other two varieties. The cross-quantity elasticities are all negative, reflecting substitution at the uncompensated level.
The quality estimates indicate that if the RW shares of tangerines, grapefruit and oranges are increased say by 10 percentage points, their prices would increase by 7.6%, 2.7% and .8%, respectively, excluding cross effects. The cross-RW estimates indicate negative impacts on competing varietal prices, and if, for example, the RW share of tangerines is increased by 10 percentage points, the prices of grapefruit and oranges would each decrease by about 2.1%. To the extent the fruit in each varietal category is ranked by quality and the highest quality fruit is sold as RW, the results suggest that the retail price and hence revenue might be enhanced by some additional sorting of FW fruit by quality and selling more as RW. Other factors, however, may offset such possible benefits. For example, RW fruit may be subject to a higher spoilage rate as a result of consumer handling of the fruit, and the bags and other containers in which FW fruit is sold may hide external fruit blemishes to some degree, although internal quality of the fruit may be relatively good.
In the empirical application here, the uniform substitute restrictions or essentially equivalent restrictions suggested by Duffy reduce the preference-variable parameter space by a factor of n-1 where again n is the number of goods. Three RW coefficients were estimated for the six RW impacts in the model--three RW variables per equation times two equations with the impacts for the third equation determined from the addingup condition. More generally, for system of n equations, n coefficients would need to be estimated for n x n-1 preference effects. Thus, to the extent the uniform substitute or Duffy assumptions are acceptable, the reduction in the parameter space could be quite large.
The results of this study may also be of interest for demand analyses where it is useful to have corresponding estimates of direct and inverse demand elasticities or impacts with respect to some preference variables. Based on equation (11b), the inverse demand elasticities with respect to the preference variables are (I -ι w')γ, while based on equation (10b), the direct demand elasticities with respect to the preference variables are -ε * γ. It was also found that δε * = I -ι w' where δ is the matrix of uncompensated quantity elasticities for the inverse demand equations. Thus, multiplying -δ -1 , which equals -ε or the negative of the uncompensated price elasticities for the direct demand equations, times the inverse preference variable elasticities (I -ι w')γ yields the direct demand, preference variable elasticities -ε * γ. In the present analysis, the direct demand, own-RW impacts (∂(log q i )/∂z i ) at mean budget shares are 1.01 (.27) for grapefruit, .31 (.08) for oranges and 3.91 (.76), with the corresponding inverse demand, own-RW impacts (∂(log p i )/∂z i ) from Table 3 in parentheses. The relatively large direct demand impact for tangerines is a result of a relatively high (direct demand) own-price elasticity, corresponding to the relatively low (inverse demand) own-quantity elasticity, and a relatively high impact (γ) of the RW variable on the marginal utility for tangerines.
Conclusions
This paper extends the Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship to specifying preference variable shifts in inverse demand systems. The Tintner-Ichimura-Basmann relationship indicates how effects of preference variables on quantities demanded are related to price effects and effects of the preference variables on the marginal utilities. This relationship has been a source of restrictions on preference coefficients in direct demand systems.
The extension here is based on the relationship between the direct and indirect demand systems and the corresponding preference variable impacts in each system. In both systems, a change in a preference variable has the same basic impacts on the marginal utilities, but in the direct demand system, the impacts on the marginal utilities results in demand impacts through the price effects, while in the inverse demand system the marginal utility impacts result in impacts on prices through the budget shares.
The addition of a set of preference variables like product specific advertising levels results in a relatively large increase in the parameter space of direct and inverse demand systems, which may make estimation of the preference variable impacts difficult.
For such demand models, theoretically based restrictions on the preference variable impacts may be of interest. This paper shows that restrictions on the impacts of preference variables on marginal utilities offer an approach to estimating the effects of preference variables in not only direct demand systems but also inverse demand systems.
An empirical study of the demand for fresh citrus illustrates the modeling approach.
Varietal specific, quality variables are assumed to impact prices through the marginal utilities similarly as has been suggested for direct demand systems. The preference variable specifications of this study may not only be of interest for estimation but may also be useful for converting direct demand system impacts to inverse demand system impacts and vice versa, to help in understanding market behavior. (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a,b) .
2 Alternative popular demand models based on the cost or expenditure function such as, for example, the recent nested PIGLOG model (Piggott) (1), is also applicable for AIDS-like models. An approximation of the
